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3Abstract
World marine fisheries suffer from economic and biological overfishing: too many vessels
are harvesting too few fish stocks. Fisheries economics has explained the causes of
overfishing and provided a theoretical background for management systems capable of
solving the problem. Yet only a few examples of fisheries managed by the principles of
the bioeconomic theory exist.
With the aim of bridging the gap between the actual fish stock assessment models used
to provide management advice and economic optimisation models, the thesis explores
economically sound harvesting from national and international perspectives. Using data
calibrated for the Baltic salmon and herring stocks, optimal harvesting policies are
outlined using numerical methods.
First, the thesis focuses on the socially optimal harvest of a single salmon stock by
commercial and recreational fisheries. The results obtained using dynamic programming
show that the optimal fishery configuration would be to close down three out of the five
studied fisheries. The result is robust to stock size fluctuations. Compared to a base case
situation, the optimal fleet structure would yield a slight decrease in the commercial catch,
but a recreational catch that is nearly seven times higher. As a result, the expected
economic net benefits from the fishery would increase nearly 60%, and the expected
number of juvenile salmon (smolt) would increase by 30%.
Second, the thesis explores the management of multiple salmon stocks in an
international framework. Non-cooperative and cooperative game theory are used to
demonstrate different "what if" scenarios. The results of the four player game suggest that,
despite the commonly agreed fishing quota, the behaviour of the countries has been closer
to non-cooperation than cooperation. Cooperation would more than double the net benefits
from the fishery compared to a past fisheries policy. Side payments, however, are a
prerequisite for a cooperative solution.
Third, the thesis applies coalitional games in the partition function form to study
whether the cooperative solution would be stable despite the potential presence of positive
externalities. The results show that the cooperation of two out of four studied countries
can be stable. Compared to a past fisheries policy, a stable coalition structure would
provide substantial economic benefits. Nevertheless, the status of the salmon stocks would
not improve significantly.
Fourth, the thesis studies the prerequisites for and potential consequences of the
implementation of an individual transferable quota (ITQ) system in the Finnish herring
fishery. Simulation results suggest that ITQs would result in a decrease in the number of
fishing vessels, but enables positive profits to overlap with a higher stock size.
The empirical findings of the thesis affirm that the profitability of the studied fisheries
could be improved. The evidence, however, indicates that incentives for free riding exist,
and thus the most preferable outcome both in economic and biological terms is elusive.
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81 Introduction to Essays on the Bioeconomics of the
Northern Baltic Fisheries
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, in 2007, 27%
of the world’s fish stocks were either over-exploited or already depleted (FAO 2009).
Also, in the European Union, the fishing fleets suffer from overcapacity, and as high a
share as 80% of the fish stocks is harvested above the maximum sustainable yield
(Commission of the European Communities 2008, European Communities 2008). This
marine fisheries crisis suggests that the advanced theory of fisheries economics is not
applied in practical fisheries management widely enough to create resource rents and
healthy fish stocks. One reason that the economic point of view has been dismissed by
natural scientists and management authorities may be the predominance of biomass
dynamic models in fisheries economics literature addressing optimal harvesting (e.g.
Deacon et al. 1998). Biomass dynamic models have been accused of being oversimplified,
and thus incapable of providing management and policy guidelines. Instead, they have
been considered as a useful pedagogical tool in teaching the basics of bioeconomics
(Hilborn and Walters 1992, Townsend 1986, Wilen 1985). Thus, the objective of this
thesis is to bridge the gap between the actual stock assessment models used to provide
management advice and economic optimisation models.
Economically sound harvesting policies are derived from national and international
perspectives. All the Baltic Sea riparian countries excluding Russia are members of the
EU. For instance, TAC (total allowable catch) decisions are made on the EU level.
Therefore, the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) sets the international frames for this
thesis. However, the member states have the power to decide on the use of other
management measures, such as time and gear restrictions or the application of ITQs
(individual transferable quotas). Further, the TAC considers commercial fishery only,
whereas the management power over the recreational use of species under the TAC is in
the hands of national authorities. The focus of the thesis is on the biologically and
economically sound harvesting of two species: Baltic salmon (Salmo Salar L.) and Baltic
herring (Clupea harengus membras L.). Both of the species are managed by TACs, and
the stock assessment preceding TAC advice is carried out by ICES (the International
Council for the Exploration of the Seas). However, economic studies related to Baltic
salmon and herring harvesting are almost non-existent.
The ecology of these two species also provides perspectives on determining interesting
research questions from the economic point of view. Salmon is an anadromous species,
implying that during its feeding migration it is harvested by several countries, but during
its spawning migration some stocks are mainly harvested by a single country with
sequential fisheries. In contrast, herring is a pelagic species and one of the most important
herring stocks in the Baltic Sea - the Bothnian Sea herring stock - is, compared to salmon,
a local stock.
To these ends, the thesis combines the existing state-of-the-art population models of
salmon and herring with the salient economic characteristics of the fleets targeting these
species. Thus, the bioeconomic models underlying the thesis are complex relative to the
mainstream models of fisheries economics. Optimal harvesting policies are therefore
9outlined using numerical methods. Internationally interesting problems are studied by
applying both non-cooperative and cooperative game theory and coalition games in
partition function form.
The aim of this introduction is to provide the context for the essays of the thesis. Thus,
the following section reviews the existing bioeconomic literature on the topics necessary
to demonstrate the thesis's niche. Further, fishery-specific knowledge prerequisite to
understanding the developed models is provided. This chapter will be closed with a review
of the thesis's essays, which are shortly introduced here. The thesis contains four essays: I)
'Reconciling economic and biological modeling of migratory fish stocks: Optimal
management of the Atlantic salmon fishery in the Baltic Sea'. This essay is a baseline of
the thesis in a sense that it introduces an age-structured salmon fishery model and provides
socially optimal policy implications attained by using dynamic programming. The
application is made for one country and one salmon stock. Essay II) 'International
Management of the Atlantic Salmon Fishery in the Baltic Sea' turns the perspective to
internationally optimal harvesting. The underlying biological model accounts for the age
structure of 15 salmon stocks, and the economic model considers four countries.
Outcomes of non-cooperative and cooperative games are compared to the performance of
the fishery under the present management. Essay III) 'Atlantic Salmon Fishery in the
Baltic Sea - A Case of Trivial Cooperation' expands on Essay II by applying a coalition
game in the partition function form to the model developed in Essay II. Essay IV)
'Individual Transferable Quotas in the Baltic Sea Herring Fishery: a Socio-bioeconomic
Analysis' introduces the first bioeconomic model for the Finnish herring fishery. The
model is applied in order to give insights into the potential benefits from ITQs over the
present management system.
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2 Bioeconomics
2.1 Age-structured models and economic optimisation
The common denominators among the essays of the thesis are that 1) the population
dynamic model underlying the analyses accounts for the age structure of the examined fish
stock and that 2) the solutions for the economic optimisation problems are produced
through numerical methods. However, the seminal bioeconomic models in fisheries
economics literature by Gordon (1954) and Schaefer (1957) in a static framework and
later Clark and Munro (1975) in a dynamic framework, applied biomass dynamic
population models and provided analytical solutions. Different regulatory schemes for
fisheries were analysed in similar settings by Clark (1980a). Game theoretical applications
started also by adopting biomass dynamic models, but dynamic analysis by Munro (1979)
and Clark (1980b) preceded the static formulation by Mesterton-Gibbons (1993).
The age structure of a fish stock includes important information regarding the fish
stock dynamics and future harvesting possibilities. For instance, fisheries ecologists have
concluded that the protection of older fish, especially old females, can be a key towards
sustainable fisheries (Anderson et al. 2008, Conover and Munch 2002, Palumbi 2004).
Surprisingly, the use of age-structured models in analytical fisheries economics is not very
common, despite the fact that according to Tahvonen (2008), about 99% of the present
biological fisheries models take into account the age structure of a population. Analytical
fisheries economics models addressing the optimal harvesting of an age-structured
population have mainly built upon the Beverton and Holt (1957) approach. However, this
has lead to the conclusion, for instance by Clark (1990), that age-structured models are too
complex for analytical solutions. Recently, Tahvonen (2009) applied a somewhat different
approach and showed that age-structured fishery models are analytically tractable. He
further argued that accounting for biological realism in the form of age structure in
economic research may increase economists' contribution to practical management and
increase dialogue between scientists in the field (Tahvonen 2008).
In the field of empirical fisheries economics and its game theoretical applications, age-
structured models are common. In general, empirical applications restrict their optimal
policy implications to comparisons of economic outcomes of management options or to
the results attained via open-loop optimisation (e.g. Sumaila 1995, Pintassilgo and Duarte
2002, Bjørndal, Ussif & Sumaila 2004). In open-loop optimisation, the objective function
is maximised by finding a constant in time level for the decision variable, given the
population dynamics. In contrast, for optimal feedback solutions, the optimal solution is a
function of time and fish stock. Further, in the case of an age-structured model, the
optimal solution is derived for each age group. For instance, Bertignac et al. (2001) and
Moxnes (2005) have taken steps towards optimal harvesting solutions. However, their
approach was restricted to static linear programming and the requirement that the optimal
harvest is a function of biomass, respectively.
In order to produce an optimal feedback solution for a model with six state and five
decision variables, Essay I applies dynamic programming (Bellman 1957). The solution is
found numerically by applying a collocation method where the Bellman functional
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equation is replaced with a system of n nonlinear equations in n unknowns. The resulting
system of nonlinear equations, which is called a collocation equation, can then be solved
using any nonlinear equation solution method. (Mercenier and Michel 1994, Biegler and
Grossmann 2004) Here the solution is executed by using MATLAB together with the
CompEcon toolbox (Miranda and Fackler 2002). Two essays of the thesis (II & III) that
apply game theory employ open-loop optimisation. Thus, the games are semi-dynamic in
the sense that even if the population dynamics evolves in time, the players make their
decisions at the beginning of the game and keep their strategies constant during the game.
The true novelty of the developed models using this stylised optimisation is in the
modelling approach. The models are executed using object-oriented programming, and
they are compatible with the models developed with FLR (Fisheries Library for R) by Kell
et al. (2007). Such an approach allows tracing the life cycle and age structure of 15 salmon
stocks (http://flr-project.org/). In addition, this framework is accompanied by an algorithm
that is able to solve the Nash equilibrium (Nash 1951, 1953) of the games.
2.2 Individual transferable quota (ITQ): a practical tool towards
the optimum
Under an ITQ scheme the TAC is divided into smaller quotas or shares, which in turn are
allocated to individual fishermen or companies. These individual quotas can then be
traded or leased. Hence, the most efficient fishers should be able to buy more quotas, and
consequently, the TAC should be harvested with minimum costs. Originally, ITQs were
proposed as a tool to provide economic incentives to stop the "race for fish" (Christy 1973,
Moloney and Pearse 1979). When the discussion of ITQs started, the majority of the
literature on it was in obscure publications, and economic analyses regarding property
rights in the literature on pollution remained unexplored in fisheries literature (Scott 1979,
Brown 2000).
One of the earliest analytical contributors in ITQ literature was Clark (1980a), who
showed that if the TAC corresponds to the optimal sustainable catch, then the ITQ and the
catch tax are equivalent in terms of economic efficiency. Copes (1986) criticised ITQs, but
did not provide analytical results. Boyce (1992) in turn corresponded to the critiques of
Copes and showed that ITQs are able to eliminate the costly race for fish, but only if no
production externalities are present. However, despite the potential presence of
externalities, compared to open access, ITQs will result in an improvement.
Since the introduction of ITQs in practical fisheries management in the 1980s, the
number of published studies has exploded. A review by Squires et al. (1998) referred to
122 studies. Existing ITQ schemes provided a fruitful ground for empirical studies. In
particular, the early experiences of New Zealand, Iceland and Australia were examined.
For instance, Arnason (1990) proposed that ITQ prices can be used to inform annual
harvest limits, and Batsone and Sharp (2003) confirmed his proposition using data from
New Zealand's snapper fisheries. They used time series analysis and concluded that when
advising management authorities, substantial cost savings could follow from the use of
econometric modelling as a partial substitute for stock assessment methods. Moreover,
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Newell et al. (2005) studied New Zealand's ITQ schemes using econometric methods.
Their data set covered 33 species and over 150 quota markets. Among other things, they
found that especially in cases where fish stocks had recovered from overfishing after the
implementation of ITQs, quota prices reflected the status of the stocks. Kompas and Nhu
Che (2005) studied South-East Australian trawl fishery and estimated significant gains
from ITQs both in terms of efficiency and cost savings. In addition, according to Arnason
(2005, 2008), Iceland's ITQ system has been successful and has created wealth not only in
the fisheries sector but also in other sectors of society.
In contrast to the studies addressing the performance of an existing ITQ system, the
thesis provides an ex-ante insight into the potential effects of the implementation of ITQs
on the commercially most important Finnish fishery. Even if ex-ante analyses have
recently been scarce (e.g. Lanfersieck and Squires 1992, Armstrong and Sumaila 2001),
the ex-ante design principles of ITQ schemes have drawn researchers' attention (e.g.
Townsend, McColl & Young 2006, Grafton and McIlgorm 2009). In addition, the
suitability of ITQs for solving the resource use allocation between different user groups,
such as commercial and recreational fishermen and conservationists, has been further
studied (Sutinen and Johnston 2003, Arnason 2009).
2.3 Game theoretical applications
Game theory is a tool for analysing strategic interactions between multiple agents. The
United Nations Law of the Sea Convention in 1982 gave rise to the use of game theory in
fisheries economics literature. The problems studied included issues of sharing the
benefits from the exploitation of a stock moving within the EEZs (Exclusive Economic
Zones) of several coastal states (Munro 1986) and of a stock migrating between the high
seas and EEZs (Kaitala and Munro 1993, Munro 1996). The update of the convention in
1995 created a basis for the development of coalitional games. Before the introduction of
coalitional games by Kaitala and Lindroos (1998), the literature addressed non-
cooperative and cooperative behaviour in a two-player framework. Under an assumption
of asymmetric fishing costs, the equilibrium of a non-cooperative game in a static setting
was found to consist of two players both harvesting and earning positive profits
(Mesterton-Gibbons 1993), whereas under the dynamic setting only the most efficient
country would be harvesting (Clark 1980b). Munro (1979) established a framework for a
fisheries cooperative game and the use of side payments as a tool to promote cooperation.
This thesis (Essay II) applies both non-cooperative and cooperative game theory. The
outcomes of these games are then contrasted and compared with a past fisheries policy.
The outcomes of non-cooperative and cooperative games can be interpreted as 'no
management' and 'optimal management', respectively.  The Relative Stability Principle
(EEC Reg. no. 172/83), a corner-stone of the CFP according to which TACs are allocated
to member states, has been accused of causing inflation pressure on the overall TAC
(Boude, Boncoeur & Bailly 2001, Daw and Gray 2005).  Thus, by using game theory, we
gain insight into the problem called 'decision-overfishing' introduced by Eagle (2003). In
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the situation of decision-overfishing, the TAC is set above scientific recommendations.
That is to say, game theory is used to shed light on the situation illustrated in Table 1,
where the member states, in cooperation, set the TAC nearly 50% above the realised
catches. The results suggest that regardless of the CFP, the past performance of the fishery
has been closer to non-cooperation than cooperation. Moreover, the economic and
biological benefits from cooperation outweigh the results from non-cooperation. However,
in order to establish a cooperative agreement, side payments are needed.
Table 1  The salmon TAC (excluding the Gulf of Finland) and catch per country in 2007
by  number of salmon (ICES 2007 p.94, ICES 2008a p.5).
Contracting party Allocation key % Quota Catch Utilised %
Denmark 20.3 88836 16145 18.2
Estonia 2.1 9028 325 3.6
Finland 25.3 110773 63441 57.3
Germany 2.3 9884 3086 31.2
Latvia 12.9 56504 5318 9.4
Lithuania 1.5 6642 537 8.1
Poland 6.2 26950 18988 70.5
Sweden 27.5 120080 95241 79.3
Total EU 98.1 428697 203081 47.4
Russia 1.9 8740 888 10.2
TOTAL 100.0 437437 203969 46.6
The theory of coalition games affirms, however, that in order to verify that the
cooperative benefits suggested by Essay II can be reached, the stability of the cooperative
solution must be examined. Accordingly, a coalition is internally stable if none of the
members finds it optimal to leave the coalition, and it is externally stable if no player finds
it optimal to join the coalition. Usually, coalition games are a combination of non-
cooperative and cooperative games. Thus, singletons are assumed to play non-
cooperatively and grand coalition cooperatively. Further, under partial cooperation the
players inside a coalition cooperate and play non-cooperatively against the players outside
a coalition. Coalition games in characteristic function form that addresses the sharing of
cooperative surplus have been widely applied in empirical fisheries economics literature.
For instance, Lindroos and Kaitala (2000), Duarte et al. (2000) and Lindroos (2004)
employed an age-structured population model, whereas Arnason et al. (2000) used a
biomass dynamic model.
Characteristic function games, however, do not account for the possible externalities of
coalition formation. In fisheries games externalities are generally positive in the sense that
members of a coalition while cooperating tend to reduce their fishing effort and thus
increase the harvesting possibilities for non-members. Therefore, a grand coalition is
rarely equilibrium of a game (Yi 1997). Partition function games are able to analyse the
potential externalities of coalition formation. Pintassilgo (2003) was the first to apply a
partition function in the fisheries context. By using Northern Atlantic blue fin tuna as a
case study, he showed that in the presence of externalities, sharing of cooperative surplus
among coalition members is not sufficient for stable cooperation, but a legal regime is
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needed to exclude singletons from using the resource. For later applications, see e.g. Pham
Do and Folmer (2006) and Pintassilgo and Lindroos (2008).
In the presence of externalities, in order to stabilise a coalition, a sharing rule of
cooperative benefits that accounts for the free-rider benefits should be applied (Pintassilgo
2003, Kronbak and Lindroos 2007). Thus, the second application of the game theory in the
thesis applies the partition function and a sharing rule called the Almost Ideal Sharing
Scheme by Eyckmans and Finus (2004). The applied sharing rule is optimal in the sense
that it is able to stabilise a coalition with the highest aggregate payoff.
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3 Fish and Fisheries
The thesis studies two species, Baltic salmon (Salmo salar L.) and Baltic herring (Clupea
harengus membras L.), which are two out of the four species in the Baltic Sea (Figure 1)
managed by using the TACs set by the EU. The other two species are cod (Gadus morhua)
and sprat (Sprattus sprattus). Kronbak (2004) and Kronbak and Lindroos (2007) studied
the internationally optimal harvesting of cod. On the other hand, economic analyses
addressing sprat fishery are to the best of our knowledge non-existent.
Salmon fisheries have drawn more attention among economists. A few studies
considering the value of recreational angling, however, exist: Appelblad (2001), Paulrud
(2004), Parkkila (2005), Håkansson (2008) and Håkanson et al. (2004) applied cost-
benefit analysis to the salmon passage-hydropower production conflict. Setälä et al. (2002)
studied the effect of imported salmon on the price of wild salmon. Yet, in the niche of this
thesis only two earlier studies exist. Laukkanen (2001) and (2003) developed a
bioeconomic biomass dynamic model for Baltic salmon and applied dynamic optimisation
and game theory.
In contrast, the economic aspects of herring fishery are primarily addressed in research
reports. For instance, Setälä (1996) reviewed the economic impacts of the Finnish fodder
herring fishery, and later Setälä (1998) studied the effect of chilling food herring on the
Finnish food herring fishery. In their reviews Stephenson et al. (2001) linked the herring
stock to its fishing, and consumption and Vetemaa et al. (2002) described the quota
system of the Estonian herring fishery. In addition, EU fisheries statistics encompass fleets
that target Baltic herring among other species (Anon. 2004). Thus, to the best of our
knowledge, this thesis is the first to develop a bioeconomic model for the Baltic herring
fishery.
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Figure 1 The thesis studies the economically sound harvesting of salmon during their feeding
and spawning migrations in the Baltic Main Basin, the Bothnian Sea and the
Bothnian Bay. Also, the Finnish herring fishery in the Bothnian Sea is studied.
3.1 Baltic Salmon
Baltic salmon (Salmo salar L.) is geographically and genetically isolated from Atlantic
salmon stocks (Karlsson and Karlström 1994, Davidson, Birt & Green 1989). Salmon
spawn in rivers in the autumn, and the eggs hatch in the following spring. Juvenile salmon
usually spend three years in rivers, after which they migrate to the Baltic Sea in the
springtime. Adult salmon then spend 1-4 years feeding at sea until starting the spawning
migration back to their home rivers in the early summer (e.g. Karlsson and Karlström
1994). Nowadays, salmon reproduce naturally in nearly 30 rivers, but the number of wild
stocks has been known to be around one hundred. Damming, habitat destruction, pollution
and intensive fishing have been identified as the main causes of the decline. (IBSFC &
HELCOM 1999) Presently, the majority of the wild salmon production originates from
rivers located in Finland and Sweden (ICES 2008a).
In order to enhance and safeguard the wild salmon population and maintain salmon
catches, the now defunct International Baltic Sea Fishery Commission launched the
Salmon Action Plan (SAP) 1997-2010. The management objective set by the program was
to increase the natural wild salmon production to at least half of the production capacity of
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each river by 2010 while keeping salmon catches as high as possible (e.g. Erkinaro et al.
2003). The tools for achieving these partially conflicting aims of SAP included the
stocking of juvenile salmon.  Around 5 million juvenile salmon are stocked annually,
which accounted for over 90% of the total number of smolts during 1990s and lead to the
dominance of reared salmon in the catches (Romakkaniemi et al. 2003). However, in
recent years, the survival of reared salmon has decreased while the natural salmon
production has increased, and therefore the contribution of the stockings to the catches has
been less than 50% in the years 2003-2006 (ICES 2007, Kallio-Nyberg et al. 2004,
Koljonen 2006).
The salmon catches have been declining from 5600 tonnes in 1990 to 1100 tonnes in
2007, which was the lowest registered catch since 1970 (ICES 2007). The catch is taken
by different types of gear in different parts of the Baltic Sea in accordance with the salmon
feeding and spawning migrations. Also, a dramatic decline in the fishing effort has been
observed. The number of vessels has decreased by 60% during the period 2003-2007.  In
addition to the TAC, fishery is regulated by technical management measures such as the
minimum landing size of salmon or the maximum amount of hooks in the longlines. As of
2008 EU fishery regulations completely banned the use of driftnets (Council regulation
no. 88/98). In addition to these regulatory measures, the observed decline in both salmon
catches and the fishing effort has been explained by the influx of farmed Atlantic salmon
into the European fish markets, a drop in salmon prices in Europe from 10 €/kg in the
early 1980s to 3 €/kg in 2000, and recently a partial closure of the fishery due to the dioxin
contents of salmon (ICES 2007, Guillotreau 2004).
The value of commercial salmon landings in 2007 in the three most important salmon
fishing countries, Finland, Sweden and Denmark, was altogether about 2.2 million euros (
FGFRI 2009). However, the investments in stockings and river restoration indicate that
the social value of salmon in the region considerably exceeds the value of the commercial
catch. The Finnish state budget allocated nearly 1.4 million euros for annual stockings
during the years 2000-2004, and over 9 million were spent for habitat restoration during
1997-2005 (Erkinaro et al. 2003, Salminen et al. 2004). In addition, salmon and sea trout
are the most highly valued target species for recreational fishers in the Nordic countries
(Toivonen et al. 2000).
3.2 Baltic Herring
Baltic herring (Clupea harengus membras L.) is a subspecies of Atlantic herring adapted
to brackish waters. It is a pelagic species that feeds in pelagic areas but spawns in coastal
areas. (e.g. Parmanne, Rechlin & Sjöstrand 1994). In 2007 the total catch was about 230
000 tonnes, from which Finland and Sweden together harvested over 60%. Other
important countries targeting herring are Estonia, Poland and Latvia. The present catches
are near half of the catches at the beginning of 1980s. The catches and stock size have
declined in the central Baltic but increased in the Bothnian Sea. Finland catches over 90%
of the Bothnian Sea herring catch. (ICES 2008b) Herring is the most important species in
the Finnish fishery metered by landings and the value of landings (13.6 million euros in
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2007), and the Bothnian Sea has been the most important fishing area since the 1990s
(FGFRI 2008).
The Finnish herring fishery comprises approximately 90 vessels, including both
bottom and pelagic trawlers. Smaller vessels supply herring primarily for fodder, and
bigger vessels supply herring for food. In general, fodder vessels are unsuitable for fishing
herring for food due to quality demands related to hygienic requirements. Thus the fishery,
especially the food herring fishery, is very concentrated; usually, only ten percent of
herring vessels harvest herring for food. In addition to the TAC, the fishery is regulated,
for instance, by fishing time restrictions that are used to guarantee the adequacy of the
TAC for the whole fishing season.
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4 Essays of the thesis
4.1 Essay I: Reconciling economic and biological modeling of
migratory fish stocks: Optimal management of the Atlantic
salmon fishery in the Baltic Sea
Essay I extends the bioeconomic literature on the optimal management of salmon
(Laukkanen 2001, Laukkanen 2003, Charles and Reed 1985) by combining an age-
structured population dynamics model and dynamic programming. Further, the salmon
fishery studied included the benefits from recreational salmon fishery and provided a
commercial-recreational harvest allocation decision. The results show that the socially
optimal solution would be to close down three out of four commercial salmon fisheries,
resulting in a slight decrease in the commercial coastal catch but a nearly seven times
higher recreational catch compared to the present situation. The optimal fishery
configuration would increase the expected number of smolts to nearly 30%, and the
expected net benefits would increase to nearly 60%.
The paper also addressed the uncertainty related to salmon reproduction. The earlier
studies accounting for the uncertainty in this context applied aggregated biomass models
(Reed 1974, Reed 1978, Reed 1979, Clark and Kirkwood 1986, Sethi et al. 2005). Even
though the optimal policy under a stochastic model in this setting coincides with a
deterministic one, accounting for the recruitment uncertainty gives insight into the
robustness of the optimal policy. Here, the optimal policy that only two fisheries out of
five were active remains unchanged despite large positive shocks on recruitment.
4.2 Essay II: International Management of the Atlantic Salmon
Fishery in the Baltic Sea
Essay II turns the thesis's perspective from the national to the international and continues
bridging the gap between economic and biological models. Game theoretic analysis is
built upon a highly disaggregate population model that accounts for the age structure and
migration pattern of 15 wild and 6 hatchery-reared salmon stocks. The model is used in
the actual stock assessment of Baltic salmon (ICES 2008a, Michielsens et al. 2006,
Michielsens et al. 2008). The paper accounts for four countries whose fishing fleets differ
from each other in terms of the size of the fleet, fishing costs, salmon price and the stock
size available. Non-cooperative and cooperative game theory is used to build scenarios for
a retrospective analysis of the international salmon fishery. The performance of the fishery
under a past fisheries policy is compared to the non-cooperative case, whose solution is
given by a Nash equilibrium. Further, two versions of cooperation are analysed in order to
give insight into the effects of the Relative Stability Principle on cooperation.
Essay II thus contributes to the existing empirical game theory literature (Lindroos
2004, Arnason, Magnusson & Agnarsson 2000, Bjørndal and Lindroos 2004, Bjørndal et
al. 2004) by combining a state-of-the-art biological model and four heterogeneous players
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and by calibrating the model with economic data from four countries. The results show
that even though the countries harvesting salmon agree on the TAC annually, the total net
benefits from the fishery have been only slightly above the non-cooperative outcome.
However, the outcomes of the analysed cooperative games suggest a near 50-100%
increase in the total net benefits compared to the past performance of the fishery. Further,
the weakest salmon stock, the Emån, would almost double its smolt production.
4.3 Essay III: Atlantic Salmon Fishery in the Baltic Sea - A Case of
Trivial Cooperation
Essay III builds on Essay II by applying a coalition game in the partition function form to
the model developed in Essay II. The chosen method is able to reveal if the substantial
benefits of cooperation suggested by Essay II are possible to achieve. In general, fisheries
games exhibit positive externalities, i.e. countries signing a contract to exploit a stock
sustainably will yield a higher stock size to those outside the contract. Therefore the grand
coalition is rarely an equilibrium of a game (Yi 1997). The partition function approach has
recently been applied to the fisheries game (Pintassilgo 2003, Pham Do and Folmer 2006),
and Essay IV provides an empirical application to the more theoretical work by Eykmans
and Finus (2004) and Pintassilgo and Lindroos (2008). The results show that positive
externalities are present, and thus cooperation is hard. Only two-player coalitions can be
stabilised, which however increases the economic net benefits from the fishery above
those given by cooperation under the Relative Stability Principle.  However, the biological
benefits suggested by Essay II cannot be reached.
4.4 Essay IV: Individual Transferable Quotas in the Baltic Sea
Herring Fishery: a Socio-bioeconomic Analysis
Essay IV studies the Finnish herring fishery in the Bothnian Sea, and the question
addressed is "what if" Finland implemented an ITQ system. The main contribution of the
essay is the development and calibration of a bioeconomic model for the Baltic herring
fishery. The model observes two type of vessels: 1) vessels supplying herring for human
consumption and 2) vessels supplying herring for fodder. The underlying biological model
is compatible with the model used in ICES to provide management advice. The analysis of
the ITQ system relies on stylised optimisation and scenarios regarding the potential
outcomes of transferable and non-transferable quotas compared to the existing
management system. However, ex-ante analyses regarding ITQ systems are scarce (e.g.
Lanfersieck and Squires 1992, Armstrong and Sumaila 2001). The results show that a
prerequisite for realising the benefits from ITQs is a decrease in the fishing effort (in terms
of vessels and of fishing mortality). The outcome would, however, yield substantial profits
and a higher stock size. Further, the analysis regarding the present management system
revealed that the herring stock was both biologically and economically overexploited.
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The thesis also includes an erratum to Essay IV. The mistakes found in three equations
in the text do not appear in the algorithm, and thus the results remain unchanged.
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